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Many policy makers seem to have accepted as fact the proposition that acountry’s
suppression of domestic market competition, i.e., competition in the market for
non-tradables such as wholesale and retail services, can result in asurplus on that
country’s trade account. On this basis, for example, the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . has long urged Japan
to promote domestic competition as ameans of $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}_{11\mathrm{C}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . trade deficit
with Japan.l Several questions arise in relation to this proposition. First, can the
proposition be proved in arigorous economic framework? Even if it can be, should
this concern the trading partners of countries adopting anti-competitive domestic
policies? After all, trade deficits and surpluses are simply reflections of borrowing
and lending between countries and should, therefore, present no problem so long
as countries make decisions rationally. Besides, don’t anti-competitive domestic
policies harm primarily domestic consumers in countries adopting such policies?
If so, why is it that atrade-surplus country like Japan faces such strong pressures
from trading partners to promote domestic market competition?
Given these questions, it is important to investigate the effect of acountry’s
suppression of domestic market competition on trade balance and welfare. This
study, in particular, reports the most basic result on trade balance. That is,
asmall country’s suppression of domestic market competition tends to shift its
position on trade balance in the surplus direction in the short run. Afull analysis
of the model can be found in Yano (2001).
2. Model
Assume, as in the Sanyal-Jones model, there are only one non-tradable consump-
tion good $C$ and one tradable middle product $M$ ;the markets for $C$ and $M$,
respectively, may be called domestic and world markets. Acountry can become
anet exporter of $M$ in aparticular period by running atrade surplus. In that
good $C$ is anon-tradable and produced from good $M$ and labor, sector $C$ may be
thought of as the service sector including, among others, wholesalers and retailers.
Call the period between time $t-1$ and time $t$ period $t$ . The market opens and
lSee, for example, the final report of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks held
between Japan and the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . in 1989 and 1990. Many Japanese policy makers also agree with this
view, as is shown in the highly influential Maekawa Report (submitted to the Prime Minister of
Japan, 1986)
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clears at time $t=0,1$ , $\ldots$ As discussed in the Introduction, this setting is fairly
natural for the purpose of this study.
Assume that the behavior of acountry’s consumers can be described by that
of arepresentative agent. As is well known, this agent may be identified with
the present generation of the country’s consumers who are altruistic towards the
subsequent generations (Barro, 1974). The home country’s period-wise utility
function is $\mathrm{v}(c_{t}, \ell_{t})=u(c_{t})+v(\ell_{t})$ , where $c_{t}$ and $\ell_{t}$ are the aggregate consumption
demands for good $C$ and leisure, respectively, at time $t$ . This utility function is
adopted so that aseparation of the good-C price from its marginal cost may actu-
ally have adistortionary effect; in the general equilibrium setting, no distortionary
effect would be created if utility function $\mathrm{v}$ were to depend only on $c_{t}$ .
The intertemporal preference is $U= \sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\rho^{t-1}\mathrm{v}(c_{t}, \ell_{t})$ , where $0<\rho$ $<1$ .
Denote by $p_{t}$ the present value price of good $C$ at time $t$ and by $w_{t}$ that of leisure
(i.e., the wage rate) at time $t$ . The representative agent is constrained by wealth
constraint $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}(p_{t}c_{t}+w_{t}\ell_{t})=W$ ;wealth $W$ will be explicitly defined below. The
representative agent maximizes $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\rho^{t-1}\mathrm{v}(c_{t},\ell_{t})$ subject to the wealth constraint.
The first order conditions of this optimization are
$\rho^{t-1}u’(c_{t})=\gamma p_{t}$ and $\rho^{t-1}v’(\ell_{t})=\gamma w_{t}$ , (2.1)
where $\gamma$ is the associated Lagrangean multiplier.
Let $q_{t}$ be the present-value price of middle product $M$ at time $t$ . In order to
produce output, each sector uses the middle product and labor. Middle product
input must be made one period before outputs are produced. In each sector, the
technology of an individual firm is described by astandard neoclassical production
function that does not vary across firms. Thus, the marginal cost of an individual
firm is constant and equal to $MC_{t}\dot{.}=a_{Y:t}q_{t-1}+a_{Lit}w_{t}$ , $i=M$, $C$, where (ayit, $a_{Lit}$ )
is the cost-minimizing combination of good-M and labor inputs to produce one
unit of output, given $w_{t}/q_{t-1}$ . The market for $M$ is perfectly competitive. Thus,
the profit maximization of an individual good-M producer implies that the output
price, $q_{t}$ , is equal to the marginal cost, $MC_{Mt}$ ; i.e.,
$q_{t}=a_{YMt}q_{t-1}+a_{Lhtt}w_{t}$ . (2.2)
In the market for $C$, the government can control the degree of competition. By
the degree of competition, Imean the extent of aseparation between the marginal
cost of each individual producer of $C$ from the price of $C$ . This idea is formalize$\mathrm{d}$
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of as an elasticity of demand obtained from (2.1) for aconstant 7. Parameter $\mu$ ,
$0\leq\mu<1$ , reflects the monopolistic power that an individual good-C producer
possesses; $\mu=0$ implies that the market is perfectly competitive, while $\mu=1$
corresponds to the limit case in which the market is purely monopolistic. The
government controls $\mu$ , which Icall the degree of domestic imperfect $competihon^{2}$.
The profit maximization of an individual good-C producer implies that the mar-
ginal revenue, $MR_{Ct}$ , is equal to the marginal cost, $MC_{Ct}$ ; i.e.,
$(1- \frac{\mu}{\epsilon_{t}})p_{t}=a_{YCt}q_{t-1}+a_{LCt}w_{t}$ . (2.3)
Behind this setting, it is possible to think of an underlying process of Cournot-
Nash competition among the good-C producers of each period. For this purpose,
think of $\mu$ as the inverse of the number of good-C producers that the government
allows to operate. Then, it is possible to demonstrate that if each producer
perceives that the effect of achange in the price of good $C$ in aparticular period,
$p_{t}$ , on the marginal utility of wealth, 7, is negligible, its marginal revenue is equal
to $MR_{Ct}$ . It is also possible to think of $\tau=\mu/\epsilon_{t}$ as the rate of distortion imposed
by the standard distortionary policy such as aconsumption tax. In this sense,
my results are not limited to domestic competition policies but can cover broader
distortionary policies that might be imposed on non-tradables markets.
Assume that the home country owns one unit of labor, which can be either
consumed by the consumers as leisure or used by sectors $M$ and $C$ as input. Let
$y_{t}$ , $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , is the output level of good $M$ at time $t$ . The full employment
condition in the labor market can be written down as
$a_{LMt}y_{t}+a_{LCt}c_{t}+\ell_{t}=1$ . (2.4)
Let $x_{t-1}$ , $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , be the home country’s aggregate demand for middle product
$M$ at time $t-1$ , which breaks down into the input demand of sector $M$ , $a_{Y\mathrm{A}It}y_{t}$ ,
$2\mathrm{A}$ government can, and do, influence the degree of competition in its domestic market, for
example, by setting up artificial entry barriers into particular industries; artificially segmenting
markets into’ multiple sections; changing the intensity with which antitrust laws are enforced;
and allowing $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ directing trade associations to play cartel-like roles. Since the mid-1980s,
Japan has been criticized for the use of such policy tools (Johnson, 1982, Prestowitz, 1988, and
Tyson, 1993). On the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . side, the revision of anti-trust enforcement in the $1980\mathrm{s}$ is often
viewed as areaction to the Japanese industrial policy
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and that of sector C, $a_{\mathrm{Y}Ct}c_{t}$ ;i.e.,
$x_{t-1}=a_{YMt}y_{t}+a_{YCt^{\mathrm{C}}t}$ . (2.5)
At $t=0$ , the home country is endowed with afixed amount of good $M$ and
ahistorically determined foreign credit, $\overline{C}$ . The home country’s wealth at $t=0$ ,
$W$, consists of foreign credit $\overline{C}$ , the sum of present va lues of good-M and good-C
endowments, $q0 \overline{y}_{0}+\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}w_{t}$ , and the sum of present $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}1_{11}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ of monopolistic profits,
$\sum_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}}t=1\epsilon_{t}p_{t}c_{t}$
.$\mathrm{T}\infty \mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}_{11\mathrm{S}}$ , the representative consumer’$\mathrm{s}$ wealth constraint can be written
$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}(p_{t}c_{t}+w_{t}\ell_{t})=\overline{C}+q_{0}\overline{y}_{0}+\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}w_{t}+\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\frac{\mu}{\epsilon_{t}}p_{t}c_{t}(=W)$ . (2. 6)
As (2.1) indicates, $p_{t}/\rho^{t-1}$ may be thought of as the current-value price of good
$C$ at time $t$ . In asimilar sense, $q_{t}/\rho^{t-1}$ may be thought of as the current-value
price of good $M$ at time $t$ . Thus, the current value of the home country’s trade
surplus at time $t$ is equal to $s_{0}=q_{0}(\overline{y}_{0}-x_{0})/\rho^{-1}$ and
$s_{t}=q_{t}(y_{t}-x_{t})/\rho^{t-1}$ (2.7)
for $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ With this definition, the wealth constraint (2.6) can be transformed
into the intertemporal external balance $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n},3$
$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\rho^{t-1}s_{t}=-\overline{C}$ . (2.8)
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) demonstrate that acountry can become anet exporter
(or importer), $y_{t}>x_{t}$ , by running atrade surplus, $s_{t}>0$ (or deficit), so long as
acountry satisfies wealth constraint (2.8).
Since the absolute levels of present-value prices do not matter in the general
equilibrium model, the price of one good can be fixed at an arbitrary level. As seen
below, it is convenient to normalize the sequence of present-value prices by setting
$q_{0}\equiv\rho^{-1}$ . This completes the description of the model on the home country’s side.
$3\mathrm{B}\mathrm{y}(2.2)$ ,through (2.5), it holds that $q_{t}y_{t}+(1_{e}-\mathrm{A}, )p_{t}c_{t}=q_{\ell-1}x_{t-1}+w_{t}(1-\ell_{t})$ . This together
with wealth constraint (2.6) implies (2.8).
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3. Creation of aShort-Run Trade Surplus
Lwr us analyze the effect of suppression of domestic market competition on trade
balance in the small-country case. This analysis is not only of interest in and of
itself but also important as afoundation for the large-country analysis, which is
carried out elsewhere.
Suppose that the home country is asmall country, facing agiven stationary
world price of tradables; $i.e.,\hat{q}_{t-1}=0$ for $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ Then, the producers face the
same (quasi-stationary) prices of tradable input and output in the new equilibrium
as in the initial equilibrium. Thus, the wage rate must be the same as well; i.e.,
$\hat{w}_{t}=0$ for $t=1,2$ , $\ldots 4$ Since this keeps the unit cost of production unchanged,
as the consumables market becomes less competitive $(d\mu>0)$ , the consumables
producers charge ahigher, and time-invariant, price; i.e., $pt=d\mu/(1-\mu)$ for
$t=1,2$ , $\ldots 5$
These changes in prices affects economic activities. On the production side,
since $(w_{t}\overline{/q_{t-1}})=0$ , $\hat{a}_{ijt}=0$ . As aresult, by (2.4) and (2.5), changes in output
levels $dy_{t}$ and $dc_{t}$ satisfy
$dx_{t-1}=ayMdyt+a_{YC}dc_{t}$ and $-d\ell_{t}=a_{LM}dy_{t}+aLcdct$ . (3.1)
One the consumption side, since $\hat{p}_{t}=\hat{w}_{t}=0$ , it follows from (2.1) that
$dc_{t}=-c[\hat{\gamma}+d\mu/(1-\mu)]$ and $d\ell_{t}=-(1-\ell)\eta\hat{\gamma}$ , (3.2)
where $\eta\equiv-v’/[(1-\ell)v’]$ . Since, as (3.2) demonstrates, the changes in $c_{t}$ and $\ell_{t}$ are
time-invariant, by (3.1), those in tradable output and input are also time-invariant
and can be denoted as
$dx_{t-1}=dx^{s}$ and $dy_{t}=dy^{s}$ , $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ (3.3)
$4\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}$ order to demonstrate these facts, let $fl_{\Lambda\Upsilon}=a_{Y\mathrm{A}J}/\rho$ and $\theta_{C}=a_{YC}/[(1-\mu)p]$ , where
$p=p_{1}$ is the good-C price at $t=1$ in the initial equilibrium. Recall that $q_{t}=\rho^{t-1}$ in the
initial equilibrium. Since cost minimization implies $q_{t-1}da_{\}’it}+w_{t}da_{Lit}=0$ , $i=M$, $C$, as is
well known (see Jones, 1965), the following relationships follow from (2.2) and (2.3).
$A$ : $\hat{q_{t}}=\theta_{M}\hat{q_{t-1}}+(1-\theta_{\mathrm{A}I})\hat{w}_{t}$ ;
$B$ : $\hat{p}_{t}-\frac{d\mu}{1-\mu}=\theta_{C}\hat{q_{t-1}}+(1-\theta_{C})\hat{w}_{t}$ .
Since $\hat{q_{\ell-1}}=0$ for $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , it follows from equation $A$ that $\hat{w}_{t}=0$ for $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$
$5\mathrm{S}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\hat{q}t-1=\hat{w}_{t}=0$ for $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , this follows from equation $B$ of the previous footnote
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In contrast, the change in trade surplus differs between t $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ 0 and \yen
because.initial endowment $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathit{0}$ is fixed. That is to say, since q. $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ $p^{t}$ 1 in the initial
stationary equilibrium, (2.7) implies
$ds_{0}=-dx_{0}$ and $ds_{t}=dy_{t}-dx_{t}$ , $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ (3.4)
These facts give rise to the next theorem.
Theorem 1.
$\frac{ds_{0}}{d\mu}=\frac{a_{YC}c(1-\ell)\eta\rho}{\{a_{\mathrm{Y}C}a_{LM}c+(\rho-a_{YM})[(1-\ell)\eta+a_{LC}c]\}(1-\mu)}>0$ . (3.5)
Proof: Since $q_{t}=\rho^{t-1}$ in the initial equilibrium, by (2.8), $ds_{0}/\rho=-\Sigma_{t=1}^{\infty}\rho^{t-1}ds_{t}$
By (3.3) and (3.4), this implies $dy^{s}=dx^{s}/\rho$ . Thus, by (3.3), $dy_{t}=dx^{s}/\rho$ and
$dx_{t-1}=dxs$ . By using these expressions together with (3.2), (3.1) can be trans-
formed into asimultaneous system of equations for $\hat{\gamma}$ and $dx3$ . By solving this
system, $ds\mathrm{o}=-dx^{s}$ can be expressed as (3.5). Since $q_{t}=\rho^{t-1}$ in the initial equi-
librium, by (2.2), it holds that $\rho-a_{YM}>0$ . Thus, the right-hand side of (3.5) is
positive. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1implies that asmall country’s suppression of domestic market com-
petition can change its trade balance at $t=0$ in the surplus direction, i.e., has a
trade surplus creation effect in the short run. This result can be given asimple
economic explanation, which will be discussed in the last section together with
the results derived in the next section.
Proposition 1. (short-run trade surplus creation) A small country’s suppression
of domestic market competition changes its trade balance at $t=0$ in the surplus
direction.
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